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The Supreme Court and
Indiana’s Voter ID Law
DAVID WILLIAMS
Indiana law requires that in order to vote in-person, Hoosiers mustpresent a photo ID.1 The Indiana rule is the most restrictive in the
country; every other state makes it easier to vote.2 For most people, this
requirement is, at worst, an inconvenience, but for others—the indi-
gent, and those who have difficulty getting around—it is more of a bur-
den.3 In September 2007, the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to hear two
cases involving challenges to the law. In Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, handed down in April 2008, the Court upheld the law by
a 6 to 3 vote. Although the Court observed that Indiana Republicans had
pushed the rule through the statehouse because they calculated that it
would discourage mostly Democrats from voting,4 the Court neverthe-
less held that the Voter ID law was constitutional, because it could help
to reduce voter fraud—even though that was not the reason that the leg-
islature had adopted it.5
__________________________
David Williams is John S. Hastings Professor of Law at the School of Law, Indiana University
Bloomington.
1See Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, 2005 Ind. Acts p. 2005.
2See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. __ (2008), Nos. 07-21 and 07-25
(U.S.S.Ct.April 28, 2008), slip op. at 14 n.26 (dissenting opinion of J. Souter), and at 3-5 (dis-
senting opinion of J. Breyer).
3See id. at 15 (opinion of J. Stevens announcing the judgment of the Court).
4See id. at 20.
5See id. at 5.
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Many citizens find it offensive that the political parties manipulate
the electoral law to their own advantage in this way. In this view, politi-
cians are “rigging the system.” A fair electoral scheme should be neutral,
designed to allow the people to express their will, rather than to favor
one party or another. Indiana citizens in particular may find it discom-
fiting that the Crawford case puts their state’s partisan wrangling on dis-
play to the nation. Some Hoosiers may be even more disturbed that the
Supreme Court casually upholds such maneuvering. But both the
maneuvering and the Court’s acceptance of it have been going on for a
very long time. The Crawford case does not make history, insofar as that
phrase connotes the creation of something new; rather, it perpetuates an
old historical pattern.
The most common way that partisans rig the electoral system is
gerrymandering: drawing district lines in such a way as to favor one
party. Imagine a simplified hypothetical: a state with four districts, each
electing one person to the legislature, and with one hundred voters, thir-
ty-nine Democrats and sixty-one Republicans. Because they won an ear-
lier election, the Democrats control the statehouse and have the power
to draw the district lines wherever they like. Using up-to-date demo-
graphic information and computer modeling, they create one district
with twenty-five Republicans, and three districts with thirteen
Democrats and twelve Republicans. As a result, although the Democrats
have only 39 percent of the electorate, they control 75 percent of the leg-
islature through the magic of gerrymandering. This example illustrates a
technique called “packing”: it crowds so many Republicans into the first
district that there are not enough for the other districts.
Hoosier politicians are familiar with gerrymandering. In Davis v.
Bandemer,6 the Supreme Court considered the post-1980 Republican ger-
rymander of the Indiana state legislature. To quote Justice Lewis Powell’s
separate opinion: “As one Republican House member concisely put it,
‘[t]he name of the game is to keep us in power.’”7 Nonetheless, a plural-
ity of the Court upheld the scheme against constitutional challenge. It
explained that the Constitution forbids only those gerrymanders that
“consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole”8 without explaining how one might estab-
__________________________
6478 U.S. 109 (1986).
7Id. at 177-178 (dissenting opinion of J. Powell).
8Id. at 132 (plurality opinion of J. White).
lish such degradation. More recently, the Court has gone further, hold-
ing that political gerrymanders are non-justiciable—meaning that they
are completely immune to judicial inspection.9
Crawford involved a different sort of partisan manipulation: restric-
tions on the right to vote itself. Gerrymandering divides voters into dis-
tricts in such a way as to affect the power of their votes. By contrast,
restrictions on the right to vote deny some people the franchise alto-
gether. Not all such restrictions are wrong-headed or unfair. In fact,
some are necessary to make a fair election possible. For example, to
vote, one must generally be older than eighteen, of sound mind, and res-
ident in the district in which the election is occurring. To vote in a pri-
mary election, in many states, one must be a member of the party. And
so forth. 
The State of Indiana defended its Voter ID law on just these
grounds: far from frustrating fair elections, it makes them possible by
reducing in-person voter fraud.10 If a voter must present photo identifi-
cation, it will be harder for him to claim to be someone else. To some
extent, Indiana had already increased the risk of voter fraud by failing to
update its voter rolls. The state’s failure has been so egregious that the
federal government accused it in court of violating federal election law,
and the state agreed to a consent decree in which the state admitted to
violating federal law and promised to come into compliance.11 And
because the rolls are so bloated with those who have died or moved out
of state, someone inclined to commit fraud could easily find someone to
impersonate on election day.
In short, then, some restrictions on the right to vote are entirely
appropriate, even inevitable. The Supreme Court’s task is to distinguish
between those restrictions that help to create fair elections and so are
constitutional, and those that make elections unfair and so are unconsti-
tutional. In legal terms, the Court needs a standard by which to measure
these restrictions so as to sort the wheat from the chaff. That is the issue
on which Crawford turned.
As is typical of the Court these days, the justices could not agree
on the correct analysis, and the divisions between them were somewhat
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9See Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
10See Crawford, slip op. at 7 (opinion of J. Stevens announcing the judgment of the Court).
11See id. at 12-13.
byzantine. Six thought that the law was constitutional, and three
thought the contrary. The six in the majority, however, were divided into
two camps. On the one hand, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that restrictions
on the right to vote should be judged by a contextual balancing test. In
this view, the Court should “weigh the asserted injury to the right to
vote against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden imposed by its rule.’ ”12 In Justice Stevens’s view, the
voter ID law placed only a light burden on voters, but the state’s interest
in blocking fraud was heavy. As a result, he deemed the statute constitu-
tional.13 The three Justices in dissent agreed that the balancing test was
the correct standard but in their view, the burden on the right to vote
was potentially very heavy, and the State’s interest in avoiding voter
fraud through the Voter ID law was unsubstantiated.14
The other three Justices in the majority—Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito—would have preferred a two-track
approach. In their view, the Court should apply “strict scrutiny” to
“severe burdens” on the right to vote, meaning that such burdens will be
upheld only if they serve a truly compelling state interest in the least
burdensome possible way. By contrast, the Court should treat with def-
erence those “[o]rdinary and widespread burdens” that are “merely
inconvenient.”15 In the real world, of course, a burden may be much
more severe to some people than to others. For example, the Voter ID
law will be, to most people, annoying at worst, but to the poor and
immobile, the burden may prove greater. But in Justice Scalia’s view, in
measuring the severity of a burden, the Court should consider only the
experience of the generality of people. In other words, the Court should
ignore the fact that some might encounter the law as a formidable obsta-
cle.16 Ergo, because the law did not pose a severe burden to the typical
voter, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito voted to uphold it.
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12Id. at 6 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), which in turn was quoting
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
13See id. at 20.
14See Crawford, slip op. at 1-2 (dissenting opinion of J. Souter); 1-2 (dissenting opinion of J.
Breyer).
15Crawford, slip op. at 2 (opinion of J. Scalia concurring in the judgement).
16See id. at 3-6.
In applying any of these tests, the Court must consider the evi-
dence so as to assess the degree of burden on the voter and the strength
of the state interest. Unfortunately, neither side could muster much evi-
dence to support its claims. On the one hand, it makes sense in the
abstract that the law would fall especially hard on voters without money
and without mobility. Getting a photo ID can be a bothersome process.
Indiana offers free photo IDs, but only when the voter presents a form of
“primary identification” such as a passport or birth certificate, docu-
ments which can be costly and complicated to obtain.17 Voters who do
not have photo ID typically have limited resources and feel little able to
navigate the labyrinth of government regulations. They are easily dis-
couraged and their will to vote is limited. Many will not bother to obtain
photo ID because they are busy coping with too many other problems.
Indigent voters may cast a provisional ballot without ID, but they must
travel to the county courthouse to file an affidavit within ten days—
again, difficult for those with limited resources. Truly determined voters
might overcome all these obstacles, but those without resources are
unlikely to be so determined, believing that they have a limited stake in
a system that is clearly not working for them. If this scenario is accurate,
the law must have blocked some people from voting, and yet the chal-
lengers could not point to a single person who wanted to vote but did
not because of the law.18
On the other hand, it makes sense that requiring a photo ID will
prevent people from trying to vote under someone else’s name. But the
state was unable to point to a single instance of in-person voter fraud in
Indiana’s history, so it seems that the old system of voter identification—
comparing the voter’s signature on the spot with the signature provided
at registration—must have been doing a good job of blocking fraud,
without the additional burdens levied by the new law. Indeed, if this law
were necessary to deter fraud, one would expect other states to follow
Indiana’s lead, but they have not. Indiana’s law remains the most bur-
densome in the country.19
In short, for all the evidence shows, the law neither prevents a
large group of people from voting, nor circumvents voter fraud. If the
V O T E R  I D  L AW 383
__________________________
17See Crawford, slip op. at 3 (dissenting opinion of J. Breyer).
18See Crawford, slip op. at 17-18 (opinion of J. Stevens announcing the judgement of the
Court).
19See Crawford, slip op. at 18-23 (dissenting opinion of J. Souter).
law has so little effect either way, one might wonder why the legislature
bothered to pass it. The answer is that the Republican legislature passed
this law because it thought that the act would discourage Democrats
from voting. (To avoid the appearance of partisanship, I should add that
Indiana Democrats resisted the law for the same reason.) Elections are
sometimes won by a margin of only a few votes. If the law keeps even a
few Democratic voters from voting, it might swing a few elections to the
Republicans. All the Republicans in both houses of the General
Assembly voted for the measure, and all of the Democrats, except for
three who were excused, voted against it.20
Although partisan advantage was clearly the reason for the law,
that fact carried no weight in any of the Crawford Court’s four opinions,
even those that found the law unconstitutional. Three opinions—those
authored by Justices Scalia, Souter, and Breyer—do not even mention
the partisan origins of the law, although Justice Souter does object that
“it targets the poor and the weak.”21 By contrast, Justice Stevens’s opin-
ion openly recognizes that “the litigation was the result of a partisan dis-
pute that had ‘spilled out of the state house into the courts.’ ”22 And yet
Justice Stevens upholds the law on the grounds that “if a nondiscrimina-
tory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications
should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have
provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”23 In
other words, even if the real motive for the law is partisan advantage, the
Court will nevertheless uphold it so long as it also serves legitimate non-
partisan goals.
But if the Court was aware of the law’s real motive of partisan
advantage, one might have expected the Justices to look with a jaun-
diced eye on the state’s claim that the statute is critical to prevent voter
fraud. The Justices might have required the state to show that it is not
merely using concern about voter fraud as a cover. And to that end, the
Court might have demanded clear and convincing evidence that the
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20See Crawford, slip op. at 20 n.21 (opinion of J. Stevens announcing the judgment of the
Court).
21Crawford, slip op. at 29 (dissenting opinion of J. Souter).
22Crawford, slip op. at 20 (opinion of J. Stevens announcing the judgment of the Court) (quot-
ing Judge Barker’s district court opinion, Crawford v. Marion Country Election Board, 458 F.
Supp. 2d 775, 783 (SD Ind 2006).
23Id.
voter ID law is the best way to deal with a pressing problem of voter
fraud. But as we have seen, there is no evidence that in-person voter
fraud has ever occurred in Indiana, and no other state has felt the need
to adopt such a restrictive rule, even though in some of these states in-
person fraud has been a problem.
In cases of this sort, where little evidence exists on either side, the
Court inevitably makes its decisions based on background presumptions
and burdens of proof. The Court could presume the statute to be uncon-
stitutional unless the state convinces it otherwise. Instead, the Court
presumes the statute to be constitutional unless the challenger con-
vinces otherwise—a puzzling approach for the Crawford case, because
the law’s partisan nature would seem to be reason for suspicion.
The fact most relevant to the politicians and the voters—that this
law will help Republicans—has no significance for the Court. Indeed, at
one point, Justice Stevens seems to forget that fact: as we have seen, he
explains that a “nondiscriminatory law” is not automatically unconstitu-
tional just because “partisan interests may have provided one motivation
for the votes of individual legislators.”24 But in what sense is the voter ID
law nondiscriminatory? Facially, it treats everyone the same; all voters—
rich or poor, Republican or Democrat—must show photo ID. But by
Justice Stevens’s own admission, everyone in the legislature understood
that the law would in practice discriminate against Democratic voters,
and the supporters of the law clearly intended that discrimination.
Perhaps the gerrymandering cases provide the solution to this puz-
zle. In America, the majority party has traditionally adopted electoral
laws in its own favor, and this Court has been reluctant to do anything
about it. This long-standing state of affairs may have substantial histori-
cal consequences. Americans have become cynical about the political
system because they see it as a forum only for the pursuit of narrow par-
tisan advantage. This cynicism has already done damage to our democ-
racy, and in the future, it may do much more. Sitting outside the political
struggle, the Court might have functioned as a neutral umpire to prevent
partisan manipulations of the electoral system itself—the very “rules of
the game.” But the Justices have declined the invitation, and our future
will apparently be more of the same.
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